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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE

Edward L. Shinn and Donilee E. Shinn (hereinafter "Shinns" or "Appellants") appeal the
decision of the Clearwater County Board of County Commissioners to uphold the granting of
three variances from the Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance by the Clearwater County
Planning and Zoning Commission to Ed Galloway and Carole Galloway (hereinafter
"Galloways"), thereby allowing the Galloways' proposed South Fork Estates Subdivision to be
served by an access road situated within an easement across land owned by the Shinns.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

On May 23, 2006, the Galloways filed an application with the Clearwater County
Planning and Zoning Commission requesting approval to subdivide a parcel of property situated
in rural Clearwater County. (R., p. 197). During the course of the subdivision review process, it
was determined that the proposed South Fork Estates could not conform with the requirements of
the Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance without the Galloways first securing the
additional variances from said Ordinance's access road minimum requirements. rd. at 206-09.
On January 11, 2011, the Galloways filed an application for three variances from the
Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance. rd. at 61-62. After a public hearing held on March
21, 2011, the Planning and Zoning Commission granted each of the requested variances. rd. at
147-54, 199-306.
On March 25, 2011, the Shinns timely filed an Application for Appeal seeking review of
the Planning and Zoning Commission's approval of the subject variances. rd. at 28-30. After a
hearing on said appeal held on May 23, 2011, the Clearwater County Board of County
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Commissioners reversed the March 21, 2011 variance approval and remanded the Galloways'
application to the Planning and Zoning Commission for further public hearing. CR., pp. 135-39,
147-154).
On August 15, 2011, the Clearwater County Planning and Zoning Commission held
further public hearing on the subject variances and again granted each of the requested variances.
Id. at 140-146,323-89.
On August 31, 2011, Mr. and Mrs. Shinn timely filed a second Application for Appeal to
the Clearwater County Board of Commissioners. Id. at 33-35. The Clearwater County Board of
Commissioners heard said appeal on October 24,2011, and announced its decision affirming the
subject variances' approval on November 7,2011. Id. at 156-163,392-417. The Board of
Commissioners entered its written decision on November 21,2011. Id. at 156-163.
On December 19, 2011, the Clearwater County Board of County Commissioners entered
its Findings of Fact and Written Decision approving the final plat stage of the South Fork Estates
subdivision based upon the confirmation of the variances at issue. Id. at 165-7.
On December 19,2011, the Shinns timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review with the
District Court. Id. at 4-19. Oral arguments were presented on said Petition on August 28, 2012.
Id. at 579. The District Court entered its Findings and Conclusions and Judgment on September
11,2012 upholding the action ofthe Board of Commissioners. Id. at 595-600.
The Shinns timely filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court on October 18,2012. Id. at 60205. An Amended Notice of Appeal was subsequently filed on November 3,2012. Id. at 608-11.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Galloways own a 99.82 acre parcel ofland in rural Clearwater County, Idaho. CR., p.
108). Said property and the surrounding area is zoned F-1, which is designated as a low density
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rural district. Id. at 126-34, 204, 335. The Galloways' property is not adjacent to any public
road and accesses the nearest county road, Middle Road, by an easement over land owned by the
Shinns and Don Ingle. Id. at 335. The Galloways seek to subdivide said property into the South
Fork Estates subdivision consisting of 10 parcels ranging from between 6 acres and 12 acres in
size, approximately. Id. at 165-67.
The Galloways purchased said property in 1985. Id. at 384. The Galloways secured an
easement over the land now owned by the Shinns through a Grant of Easements dated September
21, 1998. Id. at 67-75. Said easement is a 30 foot wide "perpetual non-exclusive easement" for
utilities, ingress and egress. Id. Said Grant of Easement contains an express limitation that "the
easement for ingress and egress shall not be deemed a public right-of-way." Id.
Additionally, Mr. Galloway asserted during his testimony that he also retains rights under
prescriptive easements. Id. at 208-09. There has been no judicial adjudication of any such
prescriptive rights. Id.
The Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance has remained unchanged since 1985. Id.
at 38. Said Subdivision Ordinance requires, in relevant part, that access roads to a proposed
subdivision be built within a minimum 60 foot right of way, that access roads to a proposed
subdivision have a minimum twenty-four foot road surface or finished width, and that all arterial,
collector and other streets in a proposed subdivision be dedicated to the public. Id. at 95-6.
The subject variances would vary the 60 foot minimum right of way requirement to allow
for a 30 foot right of way; would vary the requirement that access roads have a minimum 24 foot
road surface or finished width to allow instead for a 18 foot width with a 15 foot "bottleneck" at
the property line; and would vary the public road requirement to allow for the access road to be a
private road. (R., pp. 63, 95-6).
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On March 21, 2011, the Clearwater County Planning and Zoning Commission heard
testimony from Mr. Galloway in support of his application. Id. at 206-32, 270-80. The Shinns,
through counsel, testified against the Galloways' application, as did neighboring property owners
Don Ingle, Roger Kinyon and Chris Marvin. Id. at 232-55. The Idaho Department of Lands,
surveyor Terry Golding, and real estate agent Jerry Strahan provided neutral comments prior to
or at said hearing. Id. at 256-70. At the conclusion of said hearing, the Planning and Zoning
Commission granted each ofthe requested variances. Id. at 135-39,305-306.
The Shinns timely appealed said decision to the Clearwater County Board of County
Commissioners. Id. at 27-31,53. After a hearing held on May 23,2011, the Clearwater County
Board of County Commissioners reversed the March 21, 2011 variance approval and remanded
the Galloways' application to the Planning and Zoning Commission for further public hearing on
the issue of whether an undue hardship exists to support the granting of the requested variances.
Id. at 53, 147-54. In its July 29, 2011 written decision, the Board of County Commissioners
concluded that the Shinns have a substantial right which may be prejudiced by the Commission's
action, and the March 21, 2011 approval was not supported by substantial evidence on the record
as a whole because no testimony was presented as what undue hardship would result if strict
compliance with the ordinance was required.

Id.

Additionally, the Board of County

Commissioners found that the language of the Grant of Easement was clear and unambiguous,
thus tentatively concluded that sufficient evidence had been presented to support the finding that
the easement is "legally adequate to allow subdivision." (R., p. 153).
On August 15, 2011, the Clearwater County Planning and Zoning Commission held a
second public hearing on the subject variances. Id. at 323-89. At said hearing, a letter from Mr.
Galloway to county staff was read into the record in support of his application and Mr. Galloway

4

again personally testified in support of his application. Id. at 331-34,337-41,364-70,384. The
Shinns through counsel, Mr. Ingle and Mr. Kinyon again testified in opposition to the
application. Id. at 342-62, 370-71. The Idaho Department of Lands again submitted written
comment in advance of the hearing indicating their neutral position on the application. Id. at
363-64. At the conclusion of this second public hearing, the Planning and Zoning Commission
again granted each of the requested variances. Id. at 140-46,387.
The Shinns timely appealed said decision to the Clearwater County Board of County
Commissioners and a hearing was held on said appeal on October 24, 2011. Id. at 33-5, 392412. On November 7, 2011, the Board of County Commissioners announced their decision
upholding the approval of the Planning and Zoning Commission. Id. at 414-17. A written
decision was entered on November 21,2011. Id. at 156-63. In its November 21,2011 decision,
the Board of County Commissioners concluded that there was sufficient evidence presented to
support the Planning and Zoning Commission's findings, stating that:
In this case, evidence to the Commission found the road as varied provided
proper, safe access, that the easement necessary to support the road as varied was
adequate, that obtaining a wider easement to comply with the ordinance was
impossible, that dedicating that easement to the public was impossible due to the
nature of the easement, and unnecessary in that there would likely be no further
developments or subdivisions using the same road for access, and that the cost of
construction, even if it were possible, to build a road which complied with the
ordinance was unduly exorbitant, especially in light of the 10 to 20 vehicle trips
per day which is all that is anticipated for this low density very rural development
at maximum housing capacity. The road as varied (easement, road width, public
dedication) was deemed adequate by reviewing professionals including the
Clearwater County Road Department and the Evergreen Fire District.
Failure to grant the requested variances would have the result in the inability to
subdivide the real property into less than 20 acre parcels, without any control or
jurisdiction over the road at all by Clearwater County, and with the possibility of
more residences being in place and a higher traffic load than as currently
proposed, due to the lack of controlling ordinances being in place for 20 acre or
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larger parcels. Thus, the public interest may actually be hurt by failure to grant
the variances.
(R., p. 159) (emphasis added).

In said decision, the Board of County Commissioners further concluded that the selfinflicted nature of an undue hardship is a factor for consideration of whether or not to grant or
deny a variance, but that it could not detennine whether the Planning and Zoning Commission
had abused its discretion by appropriately failing to consider said factor. Id. at 161. Despite this
inability to review the Planning and Zoning Commission's decision making process in this
regard, the Board of County Commissioners declined to remand the variances for further
hearing. Id.
Further, the Board's decision discussed the adequacy of the easement as follows:
In the context of planning and zoning, it is not the practice or policy of the
Clearwater County Planning and Zoning Commission, or the Board of
Commissioners, to become embroiled in disputes between landowners regarding
the intent of easements which have been granted. The County looks at the bare
language of the easement itself, and if that language appears clear and
unambiguous to the County, sufficient to provide a right of access to the proposed
subdivision, the County will not delve further into the intent of the parties
regarding that easement. The Clearwater County planning and zoning structure is
not intended, nor shall be utilized, as a substitute for a court of law to resolve
easement disputes between landowners.
The easement in question provides a bare, unequivocal grant of non-exclusive
easements to Galloway, and Galloway's heirs, successors and assigns, with the
only limitation being as follows: "This Grant of Easements is binding upon and
enures to the benefit of the heirs, assigns, and successors of the parties hereto, and
the easement for ingress and egress shall not be deemed a public right-of-way."
"Public right-of-way" is a tenn of art, defined in Idaho Code Section 40-117(9) as
a right of way open to the public and under the jurisdiction of the public highway
agency, where the agency has no obligation to construct or maintain the same.
With the grant of a variance to Galloway allowing the access road to remain a
private, rather than public road, then the easement appears on its face for planning
and zoning purposes, to allow for development.
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This is not meant nor is to be construed as a finding based upon a disputed
hearing as to the intent of the parties to the easement itself, but is to be construed
as a finding solely for agency planning and zoning purposes.
(R., p. 162).
The Shinns timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review with the District Court. Id. at 4-19.
After a hearing held on August 28, 2012, the District Court affirmed the actions of the
Clearwater County Board of Commissioners and dismissed the Shinns' Petition. Id. at 595-600.
In its Findings and Conclusions, the District Court concluded that although the Shinns have
standing to file a petition for review, they had failed to show that their substantial rights had been
prejudiced, stating:
The petitioners have standing to file a petition for review. They fear that allowing
the Galloways to subdivide their property would potentially cause an increase in
the use of the road across the petitioners' land.
The petitioners have not shown that a subdivision consisting of 10 parcels versus
5 parcels would devalue their property in any way. They have also not shown that
any potential increase in traffic over the existing non-public easement would
substantially interfere with their use or ownership of their property.
Id. at 598-99. The District Court decision did not address whether the Board's action constituted
reversible error under Idaho Code Section 67-5279. Id.

III.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

a.

Did the Board's decision prejudice Appellants' substantial rights?

b.

Does the Board's error require reversal pursuant to Idaho Code Section 67-5279(3)?

IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"When reviewing a decision by the district court acting in its appellate capacity under the
Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (lAP A), this Court analyzes the record independently of the
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district court." Hawkins v. Bonneville Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 151 Idaho 228, 231, 254 P.3d
1224,1227 (2011) (citing Marcia T. Turner, L.L.e. v. City of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 20708, 159 P.3d 840, 844-45 (2007)).
When sitting in judicial review of an agency decision, the reviewing court shall affirm the
agency action unless the court finds that the action was:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
Made upon unlawful procedure; or
Arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

I.e. § 67-5279. Additionally, the party challenging the decision of the Board must demonstrate
that its substantial rights have been prejudiced. Hawkins v. Bonneville Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs,
151 Idaho 228, 254 P.3d 1224 (2011) (citing Kirk-Hughes Dev., LLC v. Kootenai Cnty. Bd. of
Cnty. Comm'rs, 149 Idaho 555, 237 P.3d 652 (2010)).
"The Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the
evidence presented. The Court instead defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are
clearly erroneous." Urrutia v. Blaine Cnty., 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000). See
also Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley Cnty., 145 Idaho 121, 126, 176 P.3d 126, 131
(2007) (citing Cowan v. Bd. ofComm'rs of Fremont Cnty., 143 Idaho 501, 508,176 P.3d 126,
133 (2006)).
B.

THE BOARD'S ACTION PREJUDICED SHINNS' SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS.

The District Court based its decision to dismiss the Shinns' petition on the grounds that
they had not shown any prejudice to a substantial right. (R., pp. 298-99). Said decision fails to
consider said action's interference with the Shinns' property rights as servient estate owners of
the proposed access road.

Further, said action improperly adjudicates the Galloways' and
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Shinns' respective rights under the easement, which prejudices the Shinns' substantive due
process rights. This Brief will address each in tum.
1.

THE BOARD'S ACTION INTERFERES WITH SHINNS' PROPERTY
RIGHTS AS OWNERS OF THE SERVIENT ESTATE.

This Court has held that "[ s]ince a party opposing a landowner's request for a
development permit has no substantial right in seeing someone else's application adjudicated
correctly, he or she must therefore show something more. The petitioner opposing a permit must
be in jeopardy of suffering substantial harm if the project goes forward, such as a reduction in the
opponent's land value or interference with his or her use or ownership of the land." Hawkins v.
Bonneville Cnty. Bd. ofComm'rs, 151 Idaho 228, 233, 254 P.3d 1224, 1229 (2011) (citing Price
v. Payette Cnty. Bd. ofCnty. Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 431, 958 P.2d 583,588 (1998)).
Here, the Shinns are in jeopardy of suffering substantial harm to their property rights if
the variances are upheld because said variances expand the Galloways' rights as the owners of
the dominant estate to the detriment of the Shinns' rights as owners of the servient estate. Id.
Although Mr. Galloway testified as to his belief and opinion that prescriptive easement
rights exist, said rights have never been adjudicated and a subdivision application and subsequent
petition for judicial review action is not the appropriate forum to do so. (R., pp. 208-09). See
Rural Kootenai Org., Inc. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 133 Idaho 833, 842, 993 P.2d 596, 605 (1999).
Therefore, Appellants will limit their analysis of the Shinns' property rights solely based upon
the Grant of Easements dated September 21, 1998. (R., pp. 67-75).
The Galloways' rights to the access road arise under a "perpetual non-exclusive
easement" for utilities, ingress and egress.

Id.

If the easement in question had been an

"exclusive" easement, said grant would have conveyed "unfettered rights to the owners of the
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easement to use that easement for purposes specified in the grant to the exclusion of all others."
Latham v. Gamer, 105 Idaho 854, 856, 673 P.d 1048, 1050 (1983). However, because the
subject easement is a "non-exclusive easement," the only conclusion that may be reasonably
drawn is that the servient estate, here owned by the Shinns, retained rights to said easement due
to its non-exclusive nature.
Said conclusion is consistent with this Court's decision in Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho
264, 127 P.3d 167 (2005), which confirmed that "an easement allows only limited use of the
servient estate." Id. at 273, 127 P.3d at 176 (citing Carson v. Elliott, 111 Idaho 889, 890, 728
P.2d 778, 779 (Ct.App. 1986)).
This Court has described respective rights of dominant estate owners and servient estate
owners as follows:
This non-exclusive language creates a general grant of easement. In Abbott v.
Nampa School Dist. No. 131. 119 Idaho 544, 548,808 P.2d 1289, 1293 (1991), a
general grant of easement was defined as an "easement granted or reserved in
general terms, without any limitations as to its use .... " Accordingly, Abbott sets
forth several rules governing this type of easement, which apply to the present
case. First, "use of the easement includes those uses which are incidental or
necessary to the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the easement, but is limited
to those that burden the servient estate as little as possible." Id. Second, such
easements are "of unlimited reasonable use." Id. Third, these easements "are not
restricted to use merely for such purposes of the dominant estate as are reasonably
required at the time of the grant or reservation, but the right may be exercised by
the dominant owner for those purposes to which that estate may be subsequently
devoted. Thus there may be an increase in the volume and kind of use of such
easement during the course of its enjoyment." Id. Fourth, and significantly,
"absent language in the easement to the contrary, the uses made by the servient
and dominant owners may be adjusted consistent with the normal development of
their respective lands." Id. at 548-49, 808 P.2d at 1293-94. Thus, use of a general
easement may be enlarged beyond the purposes originally required at the time the
easement was created, so long as that use is reasonable and necessary and is
consistent with the normal development of the land.
McFadden v. Sein, 139 Idaho 921, 924,88 P.3d 740, 743 (2004).
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The subject controversy reflects the inherent tension between the property rights under
dominant and servient estates. Despite this tension, there is no question that the Shinns, as
owners of the servient estate, retain some propeliy rights in the access road in question. See
Luce, 142 Idaho at 273, 127 P.3d at 176; Latham, 105 Idaho at 856, 673 P.2d at 1050. While the
non-exclusive easement at issue may potentially be enlarged beyond the purposes originally
required at the time the easement was created, said enlargement must be reasonable, necessary
and consistent with the normal development of the land. Id., 88 P.3d at 743; Abbott, 119 Idaho
at 548, 808 P.2d at 1293. It follows then that the Galloways have no authority to enlarge their
use of the subject easement in any manner that unreasonable, unnecessary or inconsistent with
the normal development of the land. To do so would violate the Shinns' property rights as
owners of the servient estate because it would infringe upon their right as property owners to
exclude others.

See Evers v. Custer Cnty., 745 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that a

property owner's right to exclude others is a fundamental element of a property right).
Neither the Clearwater County Board of County Commissioners nor the Clearwater
County Planning and Zoning Commission have the authority to determine whether the proposed
variances are reasonable, necessary and consistent with the normal development of the land, thus
are a permissible enlargement of the easement; whether said variances are an impermissible
enlargement of the easement; or whether said variances violate the express restriction contained
in said easement that "the easement for ingress and egress shall not be deemed a public right-ofway." (R., pp. 67-75). See McFadden, 139 Idaho at 924, 88 P.3d at 743 (citing Abbott, 119
Idaho at 548-49,808 P.2d at 1293-94).
Likewise, it is not necessary, nor would it be appropriate under lAP A, for this Court to
fully adjudicate the parties' respective rights under the easement so as to determine whether the
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Board's action prejudices a substantial right of the Shinns. Rural Kootenai Org., Inc. v. Bd. of
Comm'rs, 133 Idaho 833, 842, 993 P.2d 596, 605 (1999). See infra § IV(B)(2). Instead, this
Court's analysis need only recognize that the Shinns, as owners of the servient estate, retain
some property rights that are potentially prejudiced by the Board's action.

Hawkins v.

Bonneville Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 151 Idaho 228, 231, 254 P.3d 1224, 1227 (2011) (citing
Marcia T. Turner, L.L.C. v. City of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 207-08, 159 P.3d 840, 844-45
(2007)).
The Board's improper action jeopardizes the Shinns' property rights in that it may have
impermissibly enlarged the rights of the Galloways to the detriment of the Shinns, thereby
infringing upon the Shinns' inherent property rights to exclude others from the access road where
said use is not within the scope of the easement. See Hawkins v. Bonneville Cnty. Bd. of
Comm'rs, 151 Idaho 228, 233, 254 P.3d 1224, 1229 (2011).
Said interference with the Shinns' property rights constitutes potential prejudice to the
Shinns' substantial rights. I.C. § 67-5279(4); Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 233,254 P.3d at 1229.
2.

THE BOARD'S ACTIONS VIOLATE SHINNS' DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS.

It is well settled that due process rights are substantial rights. Eddins v. City of Lewiston,

150 Idaho 30, 36, 244 P.3d 174, 180 (2010) (citing Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600,
610, 94 S.Ct. 1985, 1901, 40 L.Ed.2d 406, 415 (1974) ("Due process of law guarantees no
particular form of procedure; it protects substantial rights."))
In the context of a land-use decision, this Court has described due process rights as
follows:
Generally, as a procedural matter, all the parties involved in a land-use decision
have a substantial right to a reasonably fair decision-making process. Governing
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boards owe procedural fairness not just to applicants but also their interested
opponents. Both should expect proceedings that are free from procedural defects
that might reasonably have affected the final outcome. This includes the right for
all interested parties to have a meaningful opportunity to present evidence to the
governing board on salient factual issues.
Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 232-33,254 P.3d at 1228-29 (citations omitted).
Appellants do not contend that they were deprived the opportunity to present evidence to
the Planning and Zoning Commission, or Board of County Commissioners, on salient factual
issues. However, the Board's action has the practical effect of denying Appellants a meaningful
opportunity to present evidence to a district court on salient factual issues in the appropriate
forum: an action for declaratory judgment.
This Court addressed the appropriate course of action in Jasso v. Camas Cnty., 151 Idaho
790,264 P.3d 897 (2001), stating as follows:
The parties dispute whether a 'road and utility easement for ingress and egress' is
sufficient in scope to permit public access to the proposed subdivision. The
Board correctly determined that that it lacks jurisdiction to determine the
easement's nature and scope, as questions of property ownership must be resolved
by a district court. Since [the Subdivision Ordinance at issue] requires that
subdivisions with five or more lots have access to a public street or road, the
Board may not approve the subdivision application until such access is certain.
Thus, the Board may condition approval of the subdivision application upon a
district court's entry of declaratory or final judgment that the easement provides
the subdivision with the necessary access to a public road.
Id. at 797, 264 P.3d at 904 (citing McFadden v. Sein, 139 Idaho 921, 922, 88 P.3d 740, 742
(2004); Rural Kootenai Org., Inc. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 133 Idaho 833, 842, 993 P.2d 596, 605
(1999)).
Similar to the facts before this Court in Jasso, the Shinns have disputed whether the
subject easement is sufficient in scope to allow it to serve as an access road to the proposed
South Forks Estates throughout this proceeding. 151 Idaho at 797, 264 P.3d at 904 (citations
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omitted). (R., pp. 27-31, 33-5,232-246,348-62,505,517-19). As such, pursuant to this Court's
guidance in Jasso, the Board of County Commissioners should have conditioned its approval of
the variances upon a district court's entry of declaratory or final judgment that the easement is
allowed to be used as an access road for the 10 parcel proposed subdivision. 151 Idaho at 797,
264 P.3d at 904. The Board's failure to do so prejudices the Shinns' practical ability to do so
because even if the Shinns had initiated an action for declaratory judgment with respect to the
easement in light of the Board's action, the outcome of said action for declaratory judgment
would not assist this Court nor have assisted the District Comi in reviewing the Board's action
under lAPA, as said judicial review of an agency decision is limited in scope to the factors under
Idaho Code Section 67-5279. See supra § IV(A).
A declaratory judgment action in district court is the appropriate forum to adjudicate the
respective rights of the Galloways and Shinns under the Grant of Easements. Rural Kootenai

arg., Inc., 133 Idaho at 842, 993 P.2d at 604. A District Court presiding over a declaratory
judgment action is the proper authority to determine whether Galloways' proposed use of the
easement is reasonable and necessary and is consistent with the nOID1al development of the land.
McFadden v. Sein, 139 Idaho 921, 924, 88 P.3d 740, 743 (2004).
Rather than appropriately deferring to the appropriate forum of the District Court by
making its action conditional upon entry of declaratory or final judgment that the Galloways'
rights allow the use of the easement for an access road to the proposed subdivision, here, the
Board's action improperly defines the scope of the Galloways' easement rights without the
authority to adjudicate easements. Hawkins v. Bonneville Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 151 Idaho
228,234,254 P.3d 1224, 1230 (2011); Jasso v. Camas Cnty., 151 Idaho 790, 797,264 P.3d 897,
904 (2001) (citations omitted).
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As such, the Board's action deprives the Shinns of the meaningful opportunity to present
evidence in an appropriate forum, thereby prejudicing the Shinns' substantial due process rights.

I.e. § 5279(4).
THE BOARD'S ACTION CONSTITUTES REVERSABLE ERROR
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE SECTION 67-5279(3).

C.

The judicial review of an agency decision requires that the reviewing court shall affirm
the agency action unless the court finds that the action was:
a.
b.
c.
d.

In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
Made upon unlawful procedure; or
Arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

I.e. §67-5279(3).
As discussed below, the Board's actions violated both state and local statutory provisions
warranting reversal pursuant to Idaho Code Section 67-5279(3)(a), exceeded its statutory
authority warranting reversal pursuant to Idaho Code Section 67-5279(3)(b), and was arbitrary,
capricious and an abuse of its discretion warranting reversal pursuant to Idaho Code Section 675279(3)(d). This Brief will address each in tum.
1.

REVERSAL IS JUSTIFIED DUE TO VIOLATIONS OF APPLICABLE
STATUTORY PROVISIONS.

The Idaho Constitution grants counties some self-governing powers and states in relevant
part as follows:
[AJny county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within its limits, all
such local police, sanitary and other regulations are not in conflict with its charter or
with the general laws.
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Idaho Const., Art. XII, § 2 (emphasis added). The power of counties and municipalities to zone
is a police power authorized by this constitutional section. Gumprecht v. City of Coeur d'Alene,
104 Idaho 615, 661 P.2d 1214 (1983).
The application of this constitutional provision requires that a local zoning ordinance
cannot conflict the general laws of the State of Idaho, including the Idaho Code. Instead, the
granting of a variance must comply both with the local zoning ordinance and all relevant
statutory provisions under the Idaho Code.
Here, the record reflects that the Board of County Commissioners' denial of Mr. and Mrs.
Shinn's appeal violated Idaho Code Section 67-6516, which governs variance permits, and also
violated the requirements of the Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance. This Brief will, first,
discuss the Idaho Code violation and then the Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance
violation.
a.

Insufficient evidence was presented to support a finding of "an undue
hardship because of characteristics of the site."

The clear language of Idaho Code Section 67-6516 requires that a variance "may be
granted to an applicant only upon a showing of undue hardship because of the characteristics of
the site and that the variance is not in conflict with the public interest." (emphasis added.)

Here, the record reflects that insufficient evidence was presented or findings made that
there are special circumstances or conditions affecting "the characteristics of the site." (R., pp.
206-32, 270-80, 331-34, 337-41, 364-70, 384).

Instead, as discussed below, all evidence

presented, findings of fact made, and conclusions drawn as to the existence of an undue hardship
demonstrate that, at best, there are special circumstances or conditions affecting the Galloways,
namely the scope oftheir rights under the subject easement, not the site itself.
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The Board's analysis and the underlying arguments made by Mr. Galloway can be
appropriately summarized as follows:
1. The existing land use regulations are outdated and Galloways should not be held to the
standards contained therein because the requested variance is adequate.
2. Building a wider road is more expensive.
3. An undue hardship exists because the Galloways are constrained by the scope of the
easement that they own.
(R., 156-63,331-34).
None of these points demonstrate "an undue hardship because of the characteristics of the
site" as required under Idaho Code Section 67-6516.
First, as discussed further below, the Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of
County Commissioners are constrained to follow the law in its current fon11 when considering
variance requests. City of Burley v. McCaslin Lumber Co., 107 Idaho 906, 693 P.2d 1108 (Ct.
App. 1984). Whether the Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance is outdated and in need of
amendment is a public policy question to be resolved through the appropriate legislative process.

The City of Burley case involved a variance request to allow the conversion of a rental
property into a triplex as opposed to a duplex as allowed by right because said variance was
necessary to justify the expense of remodeling. Id. The Court of Appeals rejected the variance
approval stating as follows:
A variance request, like a rezoning request, focuses upon a specific parcel of
property. It invokes a quasi-judicial power. Moreover, a variance request
contemplates no modification of the zoning ordinance. It is governed strictly by
existing ordinance requirements. Therefore, in reviewing a variance decision, our
function is to determine whether the zoning board's findings are supported by
substantial evidence and, if so, whether the board's conclusions properly apply
the zoning ordinance to the facts as found.
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The district court held that the zoning board's findings - as far as they went were supported by substantial evidence. We agree. Gregerson's testimony,
which was largely undisputed tended to show that converting the rental structure
into a triplex was necessary to justify the expense of remodeling. However, the
court also upheld the board's conclusion of law, that the requirements for a
variance had been met. On this point we believe the court erred. As noted above,
the ordinance explicitly requires that "any special circumstances ... or conditions"
creating the need for a variance must be "peculiar" to the property and not
applicable "generally to land or buildings in the neighborhood." The board found
no facts satisfying this requirement.
The variance was granted because increasing the density of the land use, from a
duplex to a triplex, would make the remodeling economically feasible. However,
the same could be said of any investment in rental property. When the density of
land use is increased, the potential income flow also increases. An otherwise
unprofitable investment, such as remodeling, may become feasible. This
correlation between density of land use and the scope of feasible investments is
not "peculiar" to the property at issue in this case. It could apply to rental
properties anywhere.
This case illustrates a tension in public policy between the goal of upgrading a
community's physical housing stock and the goal of maintaining stability in the
nature and density of land uses in residential neighborhoods. Balancing these
goals is a legislative task. The Idaho Legislature and the Burley City Council
have struck a balance by allowing variances from zoning regulations but limiting
those variances to peculiar circumstances of each site. The legislative line having
been drawn, the courts and administrative entities exercising quasi-judicial
powers are constrained to follow it.
Id. at 909-10; 693 P.2d at 1111-12.
Here, as in City of Burley, the legislative line has been drawn: all variance requests in
Clearwater County involving subdivisions must comply with the requirements of Idaho Code
Section 67-6516 and the Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance, unless the requirements for
a variance are found. The Subdivision Ordinance itself does not constitute an undue hardship for
purposes of Idaho Code Section 67-6516.
Second, whether or not a requested variance is "adequate" does not support a finding of
"undue hardship because of characteristics of the site." CR., 156-63,331-34). I.C. § 67-6516.
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Adequacy is certainly an appropriate factor to consider when evaluating whether "the variance is
not in conflict with the public interest," which is also required under Idaho Code Section 676516. However, adequacy is not the appropriate standard in evaluating the existence of an
"undue hardship." Just because something lesser than what is otherwise required is "adequate"
does not mean that an "undue hardship because of characteristics of the site" exists.
Despite this lack of correlation, the Board of County Commissions cited to the
"adequacy" of the access road as varied to conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to
justifY the Commission's findings, and stated as follows:
In this case, evidence to the Commission found the road as varied provided
proper, safe access, that the easement necessary to support the road as varied was
adequate . . . and unnecessary in that there would likely be no further
developments or subdivisions using the same road for access... The road as varied
(easement, road width, public dedication) was deemed adequate by reviewing
professionals including the Clearwater County Road Department and the
Evergreen Fire District.
In prior proceedings, testimony was submitted from the Clearwater County Road
and Bridge Department Supervisor, Rob Simon, indicating that the proposed
private road access (the subject of the three variance requests) would be adequate
for safe, year round travel, especially given the low density rural nature of the
development. That information was provided again in the remand hearing of
August 15 th .
(R., pp. 159) (citations omitted, emphasis added). Just because the access road as varied may be

adequate, said adequacy fails to support the conclusion that "undue hardship because of the
characteristics of the site," Idaho Code §67-6516, nor did the Clearwater County Planning and
Zoning Commission make such a factual finding. (R., pp. 140-46). The Board lacks authority to
"substitute its judgment for that of the [Planning and Zoning Commission] as to the weight of the
evidence presented. The [Board] instead defers to the [Commission]'s findings of fact unless
they are clearly erroneous." Urrutia v. Blaine Cnty., 134 Idaho 353, 357,2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000).
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See also Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley Cnty., 145 Idaho 121, 126, 176 P.3d 126,
131 (2007) (citing Cowan v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Fremont Cnty., 143 Idaho 501, 508, 176 P.3d
126, 133 (2006)).
Third, the Board misinterpreted Idaho law when stating "[a]n undue hardship can be
created due to exorbitant expense of a requirement not justified by the development, such as with
respect to excessive road construction requirements to support a relatively few number of daily
vehicle trips caused by the development for a Board of County Commissioners finding of undue
hardship due to an expense vs. benefit analysis. (R., pp. 159-60) (citing Blaha v. Bd. of Ada
Cnty. Comm'rs, 134 Idaho 770, 773, 9 P.3d 1236, 1239 (2000)).
In Blaha, this Court did not discuss the validity of an expense versus benefit analysis in
consideration of a variance as the Board contends. 134 Idaho at 773, 9 P.3d at 1239. Instead,
this Court concluded that the Ada County Board of County Commissioners' decision was in
error because the Petitioners had waived any objections by failing to appeal the underlying
decision of the relevant highway district. Id. at 775, 9 P.3d at 1241. There is no such procedural
elTor alleged here and the Board of County Commissioners' reliance on the Blaha decision is
misplaced.
Instead, the principles established in City of Burley v. McCaslin Lumber Co., 107 Idaho
906, 693 P.2d 1108 (Ct. App. 1984), govern the application of economic feasibility in variance
requests. In City of Burley, the Court found that the economic feasibility of converting a rental
property to three rather than two units was not "peculiar to the circumstances of the site" and was
instead of general applicability.

107 Idaho at 909-10, 693 P.2d at 1111-12. ("[C]orrelation

between density of land use and the scope of feasible is not 'peculiar' to the property at issue in
this case.

It could apply to rental properties anywhere.")
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Likewise, here, the improved

economic feasibility of constructing the requested 18 foot road as opposed to a 30 foot road as
required under the Subdivision Ordinance is of general applicability caused by economic
feasibility and does not support a finding of "undue hardship due to the characteristics of the
site." I.e. § 67-6516.
Last, when the findings that the requested variances are "adequate" and compliance
would be "too expensive" are disregarded for the reasons discussed above, then the remaining
record reflects what this dispute boils down to entirely: that the Galloways' "impossibility" was
of their own making through the easement that they themselves secured. (R., pp. 67-75, 156-63,
331-34). This also fails to support a finding of "undue influence due to characteristics of the
site."

I.e. 67-6516.
There is no dispute that the Galloways purchased the property in 1985. (R., p. 384). Nor

is there any dispute that the Galloways themselves secured the easement in 1998. Id. at 67-75.
Nor is it disputed that the applicable Subdivision Ordinance has remained unchanged since the
purchase of the property. Id. at 383.
This Court considered similar facts in Dawson Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine County, 98
Idaho 506, 567 P.2d 1257 (1977), which involved the review of a denial to re-zone a parcel of
land near Sun Valley from residential/agricultural to commercial. There, this Court stated:
[WJe cannot overlook the fact that Dawson's hardship in this case is self-inflicted
since the option to purchase was exercised in full knowledge that the land was
zoned residential and that a variance for commercial use had not been granted.
As the Supreme Court of Colorado said, under similar circumstances:
Nopro's land investment was made in full knowledge of the zoning limitations. It
took the calculated risk that it could break the zoning use barrier and thereby
double the profit from its investment. Having been denied the means by which
this might be accomplished, it claims hardship. If hardship exists under the facts
of this case and we hold that it does not it was incurred voluntarily by the choice
of No pro and was self-inflicted.

21

Id. at 516,567 P.2d 1267 (quoting Nopro Co. v. Town of Cherry Hills Village, 180 Colo. 217,
504 P.2d 344,349 (1973)) (emphasis added).
Here, as in Dawson and Nopro, no hardship exists. But, even if this Court finds that
sufficient evidence exists to support the Commission's finding of undue hardship, said hardship
was incurred voluntarily by the choice of the Galloways when they secured the subject easement.
(R., pp. 67-75). While the Board correctly concluded that the self-inflicted nature of an undue
hardship is a factor for consideration of whether or not to grant or deny a variance, it could not
say whether the Planning and Zoning Commission had abused its discretion by appropriately
failing to consider said factor, and failed to remand the application for further hearing or
clarification from the Planning and Zoning Commission, which would have allowed a
reviewable record. Id. at 161. This in itself is reversible error. I.e. § 67-5279. See infra §
IV(C)(3).
Further, any such hardship that may be found has no relationship to the "characteristics
of the site" as required under Idaho Code Section 67-6516.

The record reflects that the

characteristics of "the site" - that being either the proposed access road to South Fork Estates or
the site of South Forks Estates itself did not define the terms of the grant of easement based on
"extraordinary topography" or other such physical landmark or condition that could be
interpreted to create an "undue hardship because of characteristics of the site." (R., pp. 199-307,
323-67). Instead, the undisputed evidence was that the site is "gently rolling and very capable of
putting a road at virtually any place. It's very, I mean, it's pretty dam level ground." Id. at 352.
See also id. at 126-67.
For these reasons, there was insufficient evidence presented to support a finding of
"undue hardship because of characteristics of the site" as required under Idaho Code Section 67-
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6516. The Board's action where the Commission's decision failed to include such a finding
violates Idaho Code 67-6516 and must be reversed pursuant to Idaho Code Section 675279(3)(a).
b.

No relevant findings of fact made, as to whether the requested
variances would be "injurious to other property in the area in
which the property is situated."

In addition to failing to correctly apply Idaho Code Section 67-6516, as discussed above,
the Board failed to correctly apply the Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance, which
establishes that:
No variance, as herein defined, shall be favorably acted by upon by the
Commission unless there is a finding, as a result of public hearing that ALL of the
following exist:
a.
That there are such special circumstances or conditions affecting the
property that the strict application of the provisions of this Ordinance would
clearly be impracticable or unreasonable and cause an undue hardship.
b.
That strict compliance with the requirements of the Ordinance would
result in extraordinary topography, or such other conditions would result in
inhibiting the achievement of the objectives of the Ordinance.
c.
That the granting of the specified variance will not be detrimental to the
public welfare or injurious to other property in the area in which the property is
situated.
d.
That such variance will not violate the provisions of the Idaho Code.
Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance (hereinafter "CCSO") at Art. VIII(B).
The Planning and Zoning Commission failed to include findings that the granting of the
subject variances will not be "injurious to other property in the area in which the property is
situated" in either of the two Findings of Fact and Written Decisions regarding the subject
variances. Id. at Art. VIII(B)(c). (R., pp. 135-146). Despite this shortcoming, the Planning and
Zoning Commission concluded that variance requirements had been met and approved the
variance request.

(R., p. 146).

The Clearwater County Board of County Commissioners

similarly concluded that "sufficient evidence was presented to justify the Commission's
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findings" but its Decision contained no discussion of its analysis of or conclusions regarding
whether the subject variances will be "injurious to other property in the area in which the
property is situated" as required under the Ordinance. C.C.S.O., Art. VIII(B)(c). (R., pp. 15663).
The Board sitting in its appellate capacity cannot "substitute its judgment for that of the
agency as to the weight of the evidence presented. [It] instead defers to the agency's findings of
fact unless they are clearly erroneous." Urrutia v. Blaine Cnty., 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738,
742 (2000). See also Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley Cnty., 145 Idaho 121, 126,
176 P.3d 126, 131 (2007) (citing Cowan v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Fremont Cnty., 143 Idaho 501,
508, 176 P.3d 126, 133 (2006)).
The Board's Approval of said variances in the absence of any findings of fact made to
support the required finding that the requested variances would "not be detrimental to the public
welfare or injurious to other property in the area in which the property is situated" violates the
Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance and must be reversed pursuant to Idaho Code Section
67-5279(3)(a).
2.

REVERSAL IS WARRANTED BECAUSE THE BOARD'S ACTION
EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY.

The Board's action exceeded its statutory authority because, although it took great pains
to make clear that it did not wish to do so, its Decision has the practical effect of adjudicating the
rights of the respective parties with regard to the easement, which exceeds its authority. (R., p.
162).

It is well settled under Idaho law that a local zoning authority lacks jurisdiction to

detennine an easement's nature and scope as questions of property ownership must be resolved
by a district court. Jasso v. Camas Cnty., 151 Idaho 790,797,264 P.3d 897, 904 (2011) (citing
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Rural Kootenai Org., Inc. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 133 Idaho 833, 842, 993 P.2d 596, 605 (1999).
See supra§ IV(B).
Because a local zoning authority lacks authority to determine an easement's nature and
scope, the Planning and Zoning Commission impermissibly granted the subject variance
allowing for a non-public road because it is impossible to separate the public or non-public
nature of the access road from the nature and scope of the easement, particularly where the
easement contains an express prohibition against said access road being deemed a public rightof-way. (R., p. 71). Said determination cannot be made without resolving inherent questions of
property ownership.

See supra § IV(B).

Through its approval of the relevant variance, the

Planning and Zoning Commission impermissibly answered this question in favor of the
Galloways, which exceeds its authority. Jasso, 151 Idaho at 790, 264 P.3d at 904 (citing Rural
Kootenai Org., Inc., 133 Idaho at 842,993 P.2d at 605). The Board's denial of the Shinns' appeal
ratified the Commission's improper act, which exceeded the Board's authority. Id. Said act
constitutes reversible error pursuant to Idaho Code Section 67-5279(3 )(b).
While Appellants acknowledge that this judicial review proceeding is not the proper
venue to adjudicate such questions of property ownership, it is important to note that even if the
Board's inquiry into the scope of the easement had been authorized, its conclusions were
incorrect. See McFadden v. Sein, 139921,923,88 P.3d 740, 742 (2004).
The subject easement is a "non-exclusive" easement. (R., pp. 67-75). Under Idaho law,
a "non-exclusive" easement creates a general grant of easement, the use of which "may be
enlarged beyond the purposes originally required at the time the easement was created, so long

as that use is reasonable and necessary and is consistent with the normal development of the
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land." McFadden v. Sein, 139 Idaho 921, 88 P.3d 740 (2004) (emphasis added). See supra §

IV(B).
Here, there is no dispute that the subject property and surrounding area is "very low
density rural" and that the subject variances will enlarge the easement's use. (R., pp. 126-34,
335). The record reflects that no testimony was presented as to why the proposed subdivision
into ten rather than five parcels (as allowed by right) is reasonable and necessary and consistent
with the normal development of the land, other than Mr. Galloway's assertions that the Freeman
Creek area was under development and would continue to be. Id. at 211-12. Said bald assertions
are insufficient to support a finding that the increased development allowed under the subject
variances is permissible under the terms of the subject easement. McFadden, 139 Idaho at 921,
88 P.3d at 740.

However, as discussed above, said determination would be within the

jurisdiction of the District Court in a separate action to determine the relevant questions of
property ownership, not the local planning authorities as part of a variance request. See supra §
IV(B).
For these reasons, the Board exceed its authority by attempting to adjudicate the rights of
the respective parties with regards to the easement, which justifies reversal pursuant to Idaho
Code Section 67-5279(b).
3.

THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS' DENIAL OF PETITIONERS'
APPEAL JUSTIFIES REVERSAL BECAUSE IT WAS ARBITRARY,
CAPRICIOUS AND AN ABUSE OF ITS DISCRETION.

Last, the Board's action and characterization of the Galloways' ability to comply with the
ordinance as "impossible" is an arbitrary and capricious gloss over the undisputed facts of this
dispute: that this "impossibility" was of the Galloways' own making through the easement that
they themselves secured. (R., pp. 67-75).
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The undisputed record reflects that the Galloways purchased the property in 1985. (R., p.
384). The Galloways then secured the subject easement in 1998. Id. at 67-75. The Clearwater
County Subdivision Ordinance has remained unchanged, in relevant part, at all times since the
purchase ofthe property in 1985. Id. at 383.
This Court was faced with similar facts in Dawson Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine County, 98
Idaho 506, 567 P.2d 1257 (1977), which involved the review of a denial to re-zone a parcel of
land near Sun Valley from residential/agricultural to commercial. There, the Court stated:
[W]e cannot overlook the fact that Dawson's hardship in this case is self-inflicted
since the option to purchase was exercised in full knowledge that the land was
zoned residential and that a variance for commercial use had not been granted.
As the Supreme Court of Colorado said, under similar circumstances:
Nopro's land investment was made in full knowledge of the zoning limitations. It
took the calculated risk that it could break the zoning use barrier and thereby
double the profit from its investment. Having been denied the means by which
this might be accomplished, it claims hardship. If hardship exists under the facts
of this case and we hold that it does not it was incurred voluntarily by the choice
of No pro and was self-inflicted.
Id. at 516,567 P.2d 1267 (quoting Nopro Co. v. Town of Cherry Hills Village, 180 Colo. 217,
504 P.ed 344,349 (1973)) (emphasis added).
Here, the Board correctly recognized that a "self inflicted hardship, if it exists, is a factor
to be considered in whether or not to grant or deny a variance, but it is not controlling." (R., p.
161).

However, the Board abused its discretion and acted arbitrarily and capriciously where it

stated "this Board of Commissioners cannot say that the Planning and Zoning Commission
abused its discretion when deciding to grant the variances in spite of the argument of self
inflicted hardship and finds in favor of Galloway on this issue." Id.
The Board came to this conclusion despite the Planning and Zoning Commission's failure
to acknowledge and include the self-inflicted nature of the Applicant's alleged hardship in its

27

findings of fact or written decision. Id. Said failure deprived the Board of Commissioners' and this Court's - ability to review the Planning and Zoning's Commissions decision-making
process for an abuse of discretion. See supra § IV(C)(1).
Where findings of fact under review are clearly inadequate, the reviewing court or quasijudicial body should at least initially remand the case to the agency. See Workman Family
Partnership v. City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 32, 655 P.2d 926 (1982).

To hold otherwise

authorizes the reviewing court or appellate board to substitute its judgment for that of the agency
in violation of Idaho law. See

I.e.

§67-5279(1); Woodfield v. Bd. of Professional Discipline,

127 Idaho 738, 905 P.2d 1047 (Ct. App. 1995).
Here, the Board had express authority to remand the matter to the Planning and Zoning
Commission as it had done prior. See

I.e.

§67-5279. Its failure to do so despite its express

finding that it could not conclude that the Commission had even considered the self-inflicted
nature of the alleged hardship was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion and is
sufficient grounds for reversal and remand.
For these reasons, the decision of the Board of Commissioners' denial of Petitioners'
appeal should be reversed pursuant to Idaho Code Section 67-5279(3)(d).

V.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Appellants respectfully request that this Court reverse the ruling of the
District Court and remand this matter to the Clearwater County Board of Commissioners for
further action on the basis that the Board erred and that said errors violate the Shinns' substantial
rights.
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